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I. lNTRODUCfiON 
DO YOU HAVE A LOVED ONE WITH MEMORY LOSS? 
RESEARCH TO FIND TREATMENTS FOR 
ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE IS BEING CONDUCTED AT 
The Innovative Clinical Research Center 
Study participants will receive FREE medical care for 
Alzheimer's disease, FREE memory assessment tests, FREE 
study medication, and frequent monitoring. . • • 
To qualify for a research program, your loved one must: 
• Have a responsible family member or other caregiver 
who will attend study visits and ensure that study medi-
cation is properly taken 
• Have symptoms of Alzheimer's disease-such as grad-
ually worsening short term memory, judgment, and 
. ability to perform daily activities 
• Be in othe.rwise good health. 
To learn about our studies, please contact .... 1 
* Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law. Professor 
Hoffmann teaches a number of courses focusing on law and medicine. She has served on 
several hospital and nursing hoine ethics committees, and is the Editor of the Mid-Atlantic 
Ethics Committee Newsletter and co-author of A Handbook for Nursing Home Ethics Committees. 
She was actively involved in the drafting and passage of the Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act. In 1994-1995, while on leave from the law school, she served as staff and then 
acting director of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Aging chaired by Maryland Senator 
Barbara Mikulski. 
** Chief Counsel, Division of Advice and Opinions, Maryland Office of the Attorney 
General. Mr. Schwartz has chaired the Maryland Working Group on Conducting Research 
on the Cognitively Impaired and is the prinicipal author of its reports and proposed 
statute. 
l. Advertisement, Do You Have a Loved One With Memory Lossr, WASH. PoST, Oct. 6, 
1996, at A22. 
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This advertisement appeared in a Washington, D.C. area newspa-
per in the fall of 1996. It illustrates the demand for research subjects 
who are "decisionally impaired"-that is, incapable of providing in-
formed consent to participation in medical research. The advertise-
ment suggests that "loved ones" may consent to participation in 
medical research for those who are unable to consent themselves. Do 
proxies have that authority? Should they? H the answer is yes, should 
limits be placed on that authority, and what should those limits be? 
This article discusses an effort in Maryland to answer these questions 
and establish guidelines for research with those who lack decision-
making capacity. 
II. CURRENT LEGAL UNCERTAINTI' 
A. &search-Specific Provisions 
Federal regulations regarding research on human subjects pro-
vide for two fundamental safeguards: approval by an institutional re-
view board (IRB) 2 and informed consent.3 The latter requirement 
provides that "no investigator may involve a human being as a subject 
in research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained 
the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's 
legally authorized representative. "4 The term "legally authorized rep-
resentative" is circuitously defined as "an individual or judicial or 
other body authorized under applicable law to consent on behalf of a 
prospective subject to the subject's participation in the procedure(s) 
involved in the research."5 Apart from these provisions, federal regu-
lations provide little guidance or safeguards for the conduct of re-
search on decisionally impaired patients.6 In 1978, the former 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare proposed regulations 
that would have provided additional safeguards for research on indi-
viduals institutionalized as mentally disabled.7 However, these regula-
tions were abandoned in the face of sharp controversy, in particular 
2. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1996) (explaining that federal support for research involv-
ing human subjects will be provided only if the institution where the research is to be 
conducted has certified that the research has been reviewed and approved by an IRB and 
will be subject to continuing review by the IRB). 
3. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1996). 
4. /d. 
5. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (1996). 
6. The federal regulations do establish additional safeguards for research involving 
fetuses, pregnant women and human in vitro fertilization, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1996), 
prisoners, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-.306 (1996), and children, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (1996), 
but not for research on cognitively impaired individuals. 
7. See43 Fed. Reg. 53,954 (Nov. 17, 1978). 
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the argument that they unfairly singled out the mentally ill and insti-
tutionalized for protections.8 
Because federal law leaves unanswered the question of who is a 
"legally authorized representative" for consent to research, research-
ers who seek to rely on this provision of federal law must tum to rele-
vant state law for guidance. Unfortunately, little, if any, state law 
directly addresses this issue. 
The little law that is available applies primarily to institutionalized 
individuals and either prohibits incapacitated persons from participat-
ing in experimental research or significantly limits the circumstances 
under which these individuals can participate in research. 9 Most of 
the statutes that address the issue require judicial approval or ap-
proval by a court-appointed guardian or conservator. For example, 
California law allows for consent by a conservator, but "only for medi-
cal experiments related to maintaining or improving the health of the 
subject or related to obtaining informati<m about a pathological con-
dition of the subject."10 A number of states require court approval 
before a guardian or conservator may consent to participation in med-
8. See Jessica Wilen Berg, Legal and Ethical Complexities of Consent with Cognitively Im-
paired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines, 24J. L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 19 (1996); Richardj. 
Bonnie, Research with Cognitively Impaired Subjects: Unfinished Business in the Regulation of 
Human Research, 54 ARcH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 105, 108 (1997). 
9. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.30.830 (Michie 1996) (prohibiting experimental re-
search on state mental health patients that involve "any significant risk of physical or psy-
chological harm"); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 16, § 5175(£) (1995) (prohibiting any resident of a 
state mental hospital from being approached "to participate in pharmaceutical research if 
[the] patient is incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of [the] patient's 
consent."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5174 (1995) (prohibiting certain classes of state 
mental hospital residents, regardless of competency, from participating in pharmaceutical 
research); MAss. REcs. CoDE tit 104, §§ 13.01-.05 (1995) (prohibiting research on patients 
in mental facilities that will not provide direct, therapeutic benefit and prohibiting re-
search on patients with mental disabilities where the risk is more than minimal and ex-
ceeds the benefit to the subject); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(8) (West Supp. 1997) 
(preventing state mental health patients from being "the subject of experimental re-
search," with exceptions, and prohibiting biomedical or pharmacological research from 
being performed on any individual with mental disabilities if ~at research will have no 
direct therapeutic benefit on the individual research subject). 
10. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CoDE§ 24175(b)(1) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB. 
CoDE§ 2354 (West 1991) (permitting conservator of patient who has not been adjudicated 
incompetent to consent to medical experimentation where patient does not object to par-
ticipation or where the conservator acts in good faith during a medical emergency); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFElY CoDE§ 24175(b)(2) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB. CoDE§ 2355(a) (West 
1991) (permitting conservator of patient who has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to 
give informed consent to consent even if the patient objects). In both provisions of the 
California code, informed consent given by a person other than the human subject may 
"only be for medical experiments related to maintaining or improving the health of the 
human subject or related to obtaining information about a pathological condition of the 
human subject." CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY ConE§ 24175(e) (West 1992). 
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ical research by an individual lacking decision-making capacity, 11 and 
the court must determine that the experimental treatment would be 
in the "best interests" of the ward. 12 
A few state statutes permit the parent of a child with mental retar-
dation to consent to the child's participation in medical research, 13 
but generally statutes do not explicitly allow parents or other relatives 
to consent to participation in medical research on behalf of a deci-
sionally impaired relative. Of the statutes that address the issue, none 
appears to permit research on cognitively impaired individuals with 
consent of a non-court-appointed proxy unless there are additional 
safeguards. In some cases; a statute may appear to allow consent by a 
non-court appointed representative with little oversight, but regula-
tions provide additional protections. For example, the Virginia 
mental health statute states that an individual who is a patient or resi-
dent of a hospital or other facility operated, funded, or licensed by the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services shall" [n] ot be the subject of experimental or investiga-
tional research without his prior written and informed consent or that 
of his legally authorized representative." 14 This law does not define 
"legally authorized representative" and appears to provide little in the 
way of protections for institutionalized individuals lacking decision-
making capacity. However, regulations promulgated under the stat-
ute provide that "[n] on-therapeutic research using patients or resi-
dents within an institution [for the mentally ill or mentally retarded] 
is forbidden unless it is determined by the research review committee 
II. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-677(e) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that a 
guardian may only consent to experimental biomedical or behavioral medical procedure 
or participation in any behavioral experiment "if it is intended to preserve the life or pre-
vent serious impairment of the physical health of the ward or it is intended to assist the 
ward to regain his abilities and has been approved for that person by the court"). 
12. 405 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-110 (West 1993) (providing that parent or guardian 
cannot consent to ward's participation in any "unusual, hazardous, or experimental serv-
ices" without approval by court and a determination that such services are in the "best 
interests" of the ward); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.56(3)(4) (a), (b) (West Supp. 1997) 
(prohibiting a guardian or conservator from giving consent to expetimental treatment of 
any kind unless the procedure is first approved by the court, which must determine if the 
procedure is in the "best interests" of the ward); N.H. Rt:v. STAT. ANN.§ 464-A:25(1) (c)-( e) 
(1995) (establishing that court can authorize guardian to consent to experimental treat-
ment only after ensuring that such treatment is in the "best interest" of the ward). 
13. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 393.13(4) (c)(6) (West Supp. 1997) (explaining that mentally 
retarded patient may provide required consent if competent; otherwise parents or legal 
guardian may do so); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 25-5-132 (Michie 1997) (a resident of a state insti-
tution for the mentally retarded has the right to refuse to be subjected to experimental 
medical or psychological research unless the research is authorized by a court, his guard-
ian, or his parent or guardian ad litem if the resident is a minor). 
14. VA. CooE ANN. §§ 37.1-84.1 (Michie 1996). 
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that such non-therapeutic research will not present greater than mini-
mal risk."15 
Perhaps the most ambitious effort to set standards for research 
on decisionally impaired individuals has been that of New York State. 
New York public health statutes provide that each public or private 
institution or agency that conducts human research "shall establish a 
human research review committee. "16 The consent of the committee 
and the Commissioner of the Department of Health are required for 
all research "involving minors, incompetent persons, mentally dis-
abled persons, and prisoners."17 Additionally, regulations adopted by 
the New York State Office of Mental Health set forth procedures to be 
followed for the participation of human subjects who lacked the ca-
pacity to provide informed consent or who were minors in potentially 
high-risk research involving mental illness. 18 However, the regula-
tions were struck down at the trial court level as invalid and unen-
forceable because they were found to be inconsistent with the state 
statute requiring the Commissioner of the Department of Health to 
consent to all research involving children and incompetent adults. 19 
15. 12 VA. ADMIN. CooE 5-20-40 (Michie 1997). 
16. N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw§ 2444 (McKinney 1996). 
17. /d. 
18. N.Y. CaMP. CoDES R & REcs. tiL 14, § 527.10 (1995). These· regulations required 
that before an IRB approve research on this group, it ensure that (1) "[r]isks to subjects 
[be] reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits ... to patients, and the importance of 
the knowledge that [would] reasonably be expected to result"§ 527.10 (d)(4)(ii); (2) "the 
study could not be carried out without the involvement of the incapable subjects," and that 
if the research "involved more than minimal risk and/or invasive procedures" that the 
project be "likely to produce knowledge which has overriding therapeutic importance for 
the understanding or treatment of a condition which is presented by the patient in ques-
tion." § 527.10(d)(6). The regulations further set forth detailed requirements for disclo-
sure of information to the patient or his representative regarding the risks and benefits of 
the research.§ 527.10(e)(l). Of most significance was that the regulations provided that if 
a patient lacked capacity to consent to participation in a research study, consent could be 
obtained from "(a) an individual appointed pursuant to a duly executed durable power of 
attorney specifying the authority to consent or withhold consent to participation in re-
search; or (b) an individual designated by the patient to consent or withhold consent to 
the patient's participation .... " § 527.10(e)(2)(iii). 
The regulations further specified that the individual designated by the patient may 
not be "a current employee, servant or agent of the facility and may not be affiliated with 
the research project." /d. If an individual does not designate a person to consent on his or 
her behalf, the regulations provided that consent could be obtained from "the patient's 
spouse, parent, adult child, adult sibling, guardian or a committee of the person which is 
authorized to consent to research" and that in the absence of a person from this list con-
sent could be obtained from "a close friend or a court of competent jurisdiction." 
§ 527.10(e)(2)(iv). 
19. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1995); affd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 
(N.Y. 1997),leavetoappealgrantedby684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997). See N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw 
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In a subsequent decision, an appellate court agreed with this 
finding, but took a step further by also holding that the regulations 
adopted by the New York State Office of Mental Health failed to pro-
vide for adequate notice to potential subjects, failed to include review 
procedures regarding a determination that the subject lacked deci-
sion-making capacity, and therefore violated the due process clauses 
of both the New York Constitution20 and the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.21 The court also held that the regu-
lations violated New York common law and two other state statutes. 
The court stated that for regulations of this kind to meet constitu-
tional standards, they must "at the very least, contain appropriate and 
specific provisions for notice to the potential subject that his or her 
capacity is being evaluated and for appropriate administrative and ju-
dicial review of a determination regarding capacity."22 The court ex-
plained that a constitutional analysis of the regulations was justified 
because the Commissioner of Health would be likely to issue new reg-
ulations governing human subjects research in response to the court's 
invalidation of the regulations issued by the Commissioner of Mental 
Health.23 
Without clear statutory guidance on this issue, investigators in 
most states who wish both to perform research on decisionally im-
paired individuals and to have secure legal protection would need to 
seek approval from the courts, probably by means of appointment of a 
guardian who would be authorized to make such decisions. This pro-
cedural requirement derives from the state's historical role of parens 
patriae, protecting incompetent individuals and ensuring that deci-
sions for their care are made consistently with their best interests. At 
least one court has come to this conclusion. In Kaimowitz v. Michigan 
§ 2444, subdiv. 2 (McKinney 1985) (where subject is an incompetent person, mentally dis-
abled person, minor, or prisoner, consent of subject, institution's human research review 
committee and-the Commissioner of Health must be obtained). Plaintiffs in the case were 
"patients involuntarily hospitalized at various psychiatric facilities in New York State subject 
to supervision by the [Office of Mental Health]" who had been adjudicated incapable of 
giving consent to medical treaunent and subsequently were given "beneficial medication 
over their objection." 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. These patients brought suit on their own 
behalf and on behalf of all patients in New York State psychiatric facilities out of concern 
that under the existing regulations promulgated by the Office of Mental Health, they 
could be forced "to participate in research, as subjects, without their consent." /d. 
20. N.Y. CoNST. art. I, § 6. 
21. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1995), affd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 
(N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997). 
22. /d. at 187. 
23. See id. at 185. 
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Deparlment of Mental Health, 24 the court held that "experimental psy-
chosurgery" could not legally be performed on a mentally incompe-
tent person even if a surrogate decision-maker, in this case the 
patient's family, consented. 25 
In practice, researchers' who seek the participation of decisionally 
impaired individuals in medical research have relied informally on 
family consent in these circumstances, rather than routinely, or even 
occasionally, seeking appointment of a guardian. This practice of re-
lying on family consent finds historical support. For example, the 
Declaration of Helsinki included in its principles the following: 
"Where physical or mental incapacity makes it impossible to obtain 
informed consent, or when the subject is a minor, permission from 
the responsible relative replaces that of the subject in accordance with 
national legislation."26 
Researchers' reluctance to seek judicial approval may in part be 
based o.n a belief that such procedures are unnecessary or too time-
consuming and costly. Apparently, researchers have generally as-
sumed that the approval of an IRB is sufficient to allow surrogate con-
sent to the participation of incapacitated patients in a research 
protocol. One successful lawsuit within a state will prove this assump-
tion wrong, with potentially devastating consequences for research 
conducted in that state to combat psychiatric and cognitive disorders. 
For example, the result of the court decision in T.D. v. New York State 
Office of Mental Health,27 may significantly limit research in New York 
on institutionalized individuals who are cognitively impaired. Based 
upon the appellate court opinion, residents in a New York State facil-
ity operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Health who lack deci-
sion-making capacity may not be subjects in any (non-federally 
funded) research determined to be "non-therapeutic" and to pose a 
greater than minimal risk unless the individual (prior to incapacity) 
gave "specific consent or designated a suitable surrogate from whom 
such consent" could be obtained.28 Moreover, orders issued by the 
24. 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty., Mich., 1973). 
25. 1 MENTAL DISABIU'IY L. REP. 147 (1976); see also State Court Bars Experimental Brain 
Surgery, 2 PRISON L. REP. 433, 4 75 ( 1973). 
26. Declaration of Helsinki (1948), reprinted in Council for International Organizations 
of Medical Sciences, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GuiDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL REsEARcH IN-
VOLVING HuMAN BEINGS 47 (1993). The statement appears to assume the potential for 
national legislation allowing relatives to consent to participation in research of an incapaci-
tated individual. 
27. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995), affd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 
1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997). 
28. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 177. 
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trial court after its opinion,29 and a stipulation of the parties entered 
into prior to the appellate court decision, further stated that such resi-
dents may not be subjects of non-federally funded therapeutic research 
that is of greater than minimal risk without court authorization or un-
less the individual prior to incapacity had consented to the research 
or had appointed a proxy with authorization to consent to the 
research. 30 
While the appellate decision stated explicitly that " ... the large 
majority of studies, which are therapeutic and/ or proceed upon the 
informed consent of subjects or are Federally funded, will remain un-
affected,"31 issues on appeal in the case include whether the restric-
tions on non-federally funded research should apply to federally 
funded research and whether there should be additional due process 
protections in place for therapeutic research conducted with residents 
in facilities operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Health who 
lack decision-making capacity. 32 
B. Medical Treatment Statutes 
While most states do not have laws that expressly address consent 
to conduct research with decisionally impaired patients, during the 
past two decades, most states have passed statutes that allow individu-
als to consent to receipt of medical treatment on behalf of another 
who is cognitively impaired. These proxy consent laws are of two 
types: "durable power of attorney (DPA) for health care" statutes and 
"surrogate" statutes. A handful of states, including Maryland, have en-
acted comprehensive statutes incorporating both guidelines for the 
execution of advance directives and standards for surrogate health 
29. See 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, No. 5136/91 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1996) (order to show cause 
with temporary restraining order). 
30. See also 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, No. 5136/91 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 1996). Therapeutic re-
search is defined as research "for which an Institutional Review Board has determined that 
the research holds out a prospect of direct benefit and is important to the health or well 
being of the patient and is only available in the context of the research." /d. at I 0-11. Non-
therapeutic research was defined as "all research which is not therapeutic research as that 
term was defined .... " /d. 
31. 1:D., 650 N.Y:S.2d at 177. 
32. See 650 N.Y.S.2d 1015, No. 5136/91 (App. Div. 1996) (notice of motion for leave to 
appeal; support of motion for leave to appeal; grant of motion to appeal). 
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care decision-making for incapacitated individuals.33 In Maryland the 
law is referred to as the Health Care Decisions Act. 34 
DPA statutes allow a competent individual to execute a document 
appointing an "agent" to make health care decisions for the individual 
in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated. 35. The agent's au-
thority is generally defined by the individual in the DPA itself.36 
In many states, surrogate consent statutes apply when no agent 
has been appointed. 37 These statutes typically allow a family member 
to make medical decisions for an incapacitated patient based on an 
assessment of what the patient would have wanted (a substituted judg-
ment standard) or, if that preference cannot be inferred, based upon 
the patient's best interests.38 Surrogate statutes generally include a 
priority ranking of those authorized to make decisions, usually begin-
ning with a person's spouse, followed by adult children, then parents 
and adult siblings. 39 Some statutes go further down the family chain, 
and a few include a "close friend" in the list40 
These statutes, however, do not explicitly address consent to par-
ticipation in medical research. The laws generally limit the authority 
of the agent or surrogate to decisions regarding health care or medi-
cal treatment. However, only a few states define the terms "health 
care" or "medical treatment" in their durable power of attorney for 
health care and surrogate consent statutes.41 In Maryland, the Health 
33. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. See Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to-
3262 (West 1994); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 1-43 (1993) and §§ 19a-570 to -575(1993); DEL. 
CooE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2517 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 765.101-.401 (West 1994); Kv. 
REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 311.621-.643 (Michie Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 5-
801 to -817 (West 1995); Mo. CooE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.§§ 5-601 to -608 (1994); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (Michie 1995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.505-.640 (1993); VA. CooE 
ANN.§§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1992). 
34. Mo. CooE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1994). 
35. See, e.g., Mo. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.§ 5-602 (1994). 
36. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE§ 12.22, at 164-65 (2d ed. 1995). 
37. See id. § 14.4, at 253. 
38. See id. § 14.8, at 263-66. While virtually all states have a DPA statute, only about two-
thirds have surrogate decision-making laws. See Diane E. Hoffmann, et al., How Close is 
l.nough7 Family Relationships and Attitudes Toward Advance Directives and Life Sustaining Treat-
ments, 3 J. ETHIGS, LAw & ACING 5, 18 ("As of January, 1996, 32 states and the District of 
Columbia had statutes authorizing family members to make medical treabnent decisions 
for an incapacitated relative based on the patient's wishes or his or her best interests."). 
39. See MEISEL, supra note 36 § 14.4, at 254. In states that lack such statutes, case law 
generally authorizes family members to make health care decisions for incapacitated pa-
tients. See Hoffmann et. al., supra note 38, at 19. 
40. See, e.g., Mo. CooE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.§ 5-605(a)(2)(vi) (1994). 
41. See, e.g., ANN. CAL. PRos. CooE § 4942 (West Supp. 1997) (defining "health care" as 
"any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's 
physical or mental condition"); see also GA. CooE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1997) (de-
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Care Decisions Act42 does not define health care; however, the Mary-
land Attorney General's Office stated in an opinion letter that the 
term "health care" would be synonymous with "a procedure or course 
of treatment that relates to the disease state of the particular pa-
tient."43 Thus, as long as the research being contemplated involves 
potential benefit, that is, "as long as there is an articulable link be-
tween the research and a possible improvement in the patient's condi-
tion, then a 'health care' decision is possible, and the patient's 
hYJ>othesized wishes would be the basis for it."44 
In each state, determining whether the health care decision-mak-
ing laws encompass research will require attention to the specific defi-
nition of health care in the statutes or to an inference from the other 
parts of the statutes to determine whether they should be interpreted 
to apply to any type of research, potentially therapeutic or otherwise. 
The opinion letter by the Maryland Office of the Attorney General 
may be the first authority to interpret the application of a DPA or 
surrogate decision-making statute to consent to participation in re-
search. The letter states that Maryland's law "does not authorize an 
agent or surrogate to consent to a protocol that is expected to have no 
present or future therapeutic effect on the patient. Even an advance 
directive that generally consents to participation in future research 
cannot authorize an agent's or surrogate's decision that is unrelated 
to potential therapeutic effect on the patient."45 According to the At-
torney General, while "altruism is noble,· ... it is not 'health care.' "46 
In the T.D. case, the defendants argued that the limitations in 
New York state law on surrogate decision-making for withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment47 would not apply to surrogate consent for 
participation in research for a cognitively impaired individual because 
the decision to participate in research would not lead to a patient's 
death.48 New York state has one of the nation's most restrictive rules 
regarding surrogate consent to termination or withholding of life-sus-
fining "health care" as "any care, treaunent, service or procedure to maintain, diagnose, 
treat or provide for the patient's physical or mental health or personal care"). 
42. Mo. CooE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 et. seq. 
43. Opinion Letter from jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, Office 
of the Maryland Attorney General (July 26, 1996) [hereinafter "Opinion Letter"] (on file 
with the Journal of Health Care I..aw & Policy). 
44. /d. at 2. 
45. /d. 
46. /d. 
47. See N.Y. CoMP. CooES R. & REcs. tit. 14, § 527.10 (1995). 
48. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 
281 (N.Y. 1997). 
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taining treatment from a patient who lacks decision-making capacity. 
In the majority of states that have surrogate consent statutes, surro-
gates may consent to termination of life support if it would be consis-
tent with what the patient would have wanted, or if that cannot be 
determined, if it would be in the patient's best interests.49 In New 
York, the law, as defined through court opinions, prohibits a surro-
gate from making a decision to withhold or terminate life-sustaining 
treatment from an. incapacitated patient unless there is "clear and 
convincing evidence" the patient, when competent, had provided in-
structions to have treatment terminated should he be irreversibly ill.50 
The case law does not allow the withholding or withdrawing of life-
sustaining treatment based on a best interest test.51 Thus, the defend-
ant in T.D. argued that the surrogate consent law regarding termina-
tion of life support should not apply in the research context as that 
law is too restrictive. The court rejected the defendant's argument as 
"unpersuasive with regard to ... greater than minimal risk non-thera-
peutic studies."52 Rather, the court stated that "similar substantive 
and procedural safeguards should be provided to these potential re-
search subjects as is provided to patients in life-sustaining treatment 
settings. "53 
At least one prestigious body has advocated that the framework 
used in many states for clinical decision-making for decisionally im-
paired individuals be applied to decisions regarding their participa-
tion in research. A position paper by the American College of 
Physicians .concludes that individuals should be able to consent 
through an advance directive to participation in research at a future 
time when they may be "cognitively impaired."54 Han individual has 
not executed such a directive, the position paper states that a legally 
authorized l.mrrogate should be able to consent to certain research 
protocols, using a mixed substituted judgment and best interest test.55 
49. See sufrra note 38 and accompanying text. 
50. See Matter of Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517 (N.Y. 1988); see 
also People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984). 
51. No appellate court in the state has allowed the use of a best interest test, however, 
there is a trial court opinion in which the best interest test was applied. See In re Beth 
Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
52. T.D., 650 N.Y.2d at 191. 
53. /d. 
54. American College of Physicians, Cognitively Impaired Subjects, Ill ANNAL') OF INTER· 
NAL MED. 843 (1989). 
55. /d. at 844. 
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III. THE MARYLAND Poucv INITIATIVE 
A. Identifying the Issues 
In light of uncertainty about the authority of agents and surro-
gates in Maryland to consent to participation in research on behalf of 
decisionally impaired individuals, as well as the strong and differing 
views expressed by some researchers and advocates, the Maryland At-
torney General's Office established what was called a "Working 
Group" to begin a dialogue on the issue. The Working Group con-
sisted of approximately 15 individuals, including lawyers, ethicists, re-
searchers from academic and government institutions, and advocates 
for the mentally ill. 
The Working Group held its first meeting in May, 1995. By the 
end of the meeting, the group had set its priorities to include the 
following: 
1. To address the circumstances under which an individual 
with present decisional capacity might give a legally and 
ethically valid consent to participation in research, at a 
time of future decisional incapacity, through an advance 
directive. 
2. To explore whether, under carefully limited circum-
stances, a legally and ethically valid consent to participa-
tion in research might be obtained by a proxy (health 
care agent or surrogate decision-maker) for a research 
subject who never had decisional capacity or who had 
lost decisional capacity before expressing any views 
about participation in research. 56 
In considering these issues, the Working Group was free to con-
sider whatever changes in the law were thought desirable to adapt it to 
the research setting. Indeed, there was considerable initial agreement 
among Working Group members that the Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act would best serve as an initial framework for approaching the 
issue of proxy consent to participation in research involving the deci-
sionally impaired. In its present form, however, the law did not pro-
vide sufficient safeguards if it were to be adapted as an inclusive 
mechanism for consent to research participation. 
Courts and legislatures have required additional safeguards for 
other types of surrogate decision-making for individuals lacking deci-
56. Letter from Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, Office of the 
Maryland Attorney General to Diane Hoffmann, Asst. Professor, University of Maryland, 
School of Law (May 31, I995)(on file with the journal of Health Care Law & Policy). · 
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sion-making capacity.57 Unlike cases involving refusal of life-sus-
taining treatment, where courts have deferred to families and placed 
very few limits on their decisions to terminate life support for a close 
relative, courts and legislatures have generally required safeguards 
such as judicial approval in cases involving a decision by a surrogate to 
·sterilize or administer psychotropic medications to a mentally incapac-
itated ii1dividual.58 While the Working Group did not agree this level 
of procedural protection was required for decision-making for partici-
pation in research, the reasons for additional protection in the re-
search context appeared justified by similar considerations to their 
need in decisions regarding .sterilization and the administration of 
psychotropic drugs, including: 
1) a history of abusive decision-making in these areas; 
57. See Philip M. Bein, Surrogate Consent and the Incompetent Experimental Subject, 46 Fooo 
DRUG CosMETIC LJ. 739 (1991) .. 
58. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that in situations where the 
state's police power is not implicated and a patient refuses to consent to the administration 
of antipsychotic drugs, there must be a judicial determination of whether the patient has 
the capacity to make a reasoned decision with respect to proposed treaunent before the 
drugs may be administered pursuant to the state's parens patriae power). See, e.g., People v. 
Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (en bane) (holding that antipsychotic medicine may be 
administered to a nonconsenting mentally ill patient incapable of making an informed 
treaUnent decision only after the trial court conducts a full and fair adversarial hearing; the 
court must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is incompetent, 
that treaUnent by antipsychotic medicine is necessary, that a less intrusive treaUnent alter-
native is not available, and that the patient's need for treaUnent by antipsychotic medicine 
is sufficiently compelling to override any bona fide and legitimate interest of patient in 
refusing treatment); In the Matter of Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982) (concluding that a 
guardian must obtain a proper judicial order for sterilization of an incompetent ward 
before he or she can validly consent to it; guardians and parents cannot consent to the 
sterilization of a ward in their care or custody); In re Guardianship of Roe, III, 421 N.E.2d 
40 (Mass. 1981) (holding that if an incompetent individual refuses antipsychotic drugs, 
those charged with his protection must seek judicial determination of substituted judg-
ment); In the Matter of Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (NJ. 1981) (holding that an appropriate 
court must make final determination whether consent to sterilization should be given on 
behalf of incompetent individual). 
Most courts have required that a judicial decision regarding the competency of the 
individual be made prior to a surrogate decision, and, in some cases, have insisted that the 
court make the decision for the surrogate or approve the surrogate's decision. See Rogers 
v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Health et. aL, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983) (hold-
ing that an involuntarily committed mental patient must be adjudicated incompetent by a 
judge in order to be deprived of the ability to make his or her own treaUnent decisions, 
and if a patient is adjudicated incompetent, a judge, using a substituted judgment stan-
dard, must decide whether the patient would have consented to the administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs); Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cai.App.3d 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
that prisoners are entitled to judicial determination of their competency to refuse treat-
ment before they can be subjected to long-term involuntary psychotropic medication). 
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2) the courts' concern that the family or institution seeking 
such treatments may possess interests which conflict 
with the patient's; and 
3) the intrusive nature of the treatments and their adverse 
risk to future health or family life.59 
These factors may also play a role in medical research on human 
subjects. According to one author, medical research on incapacitated 
individuals deserves heightened scrutiny and more stringent stan-
dards for a number of reasons: 
First, the history of medical experimentation has been char-
acterized by significant incidents of abuse, particularly where 
members of vulnerable populations have been enlisted as 
subjects. Second, the interest of medical researchers in se-
curing participation in the experiment often conflicts with 
their duties as treating physicians to inform, advise, and act 
in the best interest of their patients. Third, experimentation 
is inherently intrusive and dangerous, as the nature and mag-
nitude of risks involved are largely unknown and 
unknowable. 60 
The court in T.D. clearly agreed that there is a similarity between the 
administration of psychotropic and antipsychotic drugs to incapaci-
tated patients and the use of cognitively impaired patients in medical 
research. In fact, the court stated explicitly that 
practices for assessing capacity and obtaining consent for 
such experimentation must, at the very least, provide the 
same safeguards to the constitutional and common law rights 
of the incapable patients, who may be potential subjects of 
these experiments, as provided to patients over whose objec-
tion treating physicians seek to administer, solely for thera-
peutic purposes, medications, that can cause similar side-
effects.61 
The current climate of medical research in particular lends credibility 
to an argument that additional safeguards are necessary for research 
on the decisionally impaired: 
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented marriage of science 
and entrepreneurship. During that decade researchers be-
gan holding financial interests in companies whose products 
59. See Bein, supra note 57, at 751-52. 
60. ld. at 747-48. 
61. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 
281 (N.Y. 1997). 
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they were studying. This practice has created new conflicts 
for researchers. Where a company developing experimental 
products is a fledgling start-up enterprise with few existing 
markets, its stock price usually reflects expectations regard-
ing research on the new products. Rapid disclosure of suc-
cessful research results would enable early Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval and higher share prices 
often resulting in a windfall to the researcher with a financial 
interest. Conversely, a researcher holding a financial inter-
est in the company would have strong incentives not to dis-
close information which might suggest the product is 
ineffective or unsafe.62 
137 
Against this background, the Working Group proceeded to consider 
the types of additional safeguards that were necessary in the research 
context. Initial questions articulated by the group included the 
following: 
I. If an individual authorizes an agent to consent to the in-
dividual's participation in medical research protocols, 
should the law impose limits on the agent's authority, or 
should the agent be trusted to make a decision consis-
tent with the individual's wishes? If limitations are ap-
propriate, what should they be? 
2. Should an agent be authorized to consent to an incapaci-
tated individual's participation in medical research if the 
individual has not expressly given this authorization in 
the DPA? Should the standard DPA form include the 
authority of the agent to consent to the individual's par-
ticipation in medical research: 
a) that holds out the potential for direct benefit to the 
individual? 
b) that holds out no potential for direct benefit to the 
individual but that may ultimately benefit others? 
Should an agent's ability to consent be based on the 
level of risk associated with the proposed research? 
3. Should a surrogate (not legally appointed by the individ-
ual) be able to consent to the individual's participation 
in medical research: 
a) that holds out the potential for direct benefit to the 
individual? 
62. Bein, supra note 57, at 758. 
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b) that holds out no potential for direct benefit to the 
individual but that may ultimately benefit others? 
What criteria or limitations, if any, should be placed on 
the surrogate's decision-making authority? Should a sur-
rogate's authority to consent depend on the level of risk 
associated with the proposed research? 
4. In either case, agent or surrogate, should the criteria for 
proxy consent to participation of an incapacitated indi-
vidual in medical research that does not hold out the 
potential for direct benefit to the individual ever go be-
yond substituted judgment (i.e., be based on factors 
other than the individual's wishes?) 
5. Is it ever appropriate to allow surrogate consent for a 
never-capacitated individual to participate in medical re-
search that holds out no potential for direct benefit to 
the individual? 
6. Is it ever appropriate to honor the wishes of an individ-
ual written in an advance directive to participate in med-
ical research that is likely to benefit others, whether or 
not the research holds out the potential for direct bene-
fit to the individual, if the individual has not appointed 
an agent and has no legal surrogate? 
These questions, based largely on the state Health Care Decisions Act, 
combined with concepts incorporated into the federal regulations for 
research on human subjects to form the basis of the Working Group's 
deliberations. 
The Working Group presumed that the federal regulatory stan-
dards were applicable to federally funded research. The Working 
Group recognized that some elements of federal regulations-for ex-
ample, the concept of "minimal risk"-are subject to debate.63 How-
ever, the Working Group concluded that it had neither the mandate 
nor the resources to address perceived deficiencies in federal law, 
apart from the regulatory gap concerning decisionally impaired sub-
jects. Therefore, the Group's recommendations reflected the con-
cepts and categories embodied in federal law. 
63. The federal regulations define minimal risk as risks where "the probability and 
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and among 
themselves than those normally encountered in daily life or during the performance of 
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1996). 
Some difficulties with the concept of "minimal risk" are explored in Benjamin Freedman 
et al., In Loco Parentis: Minimal Risk as an Ethical Threshold for Research upon Children, 23 
HAsTINGS CENTER R£P.l3 (1993). 
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In addition, the Working Group did not explore the important 
and difficult issue of a researcher's assessment of a potential subject's 
capacity to give informed consent-in particular, the researcher's pro-
cess of deciding that an individual with a psychiatric disorder is never-
theless capable of giving ethically valid consent.64 The Working 
Group's recommendations proceeded from the assumption that, in 
every category addressed by the Working Group, the potential re-
search subject is not capable of giving informed consent to participa-
tion in a research protocol at the time of potential enrollment.65 
B. Framing Recommendations on Proxy Consent 
The Working Group organized its discussion and preliminary rec-
ommendations by reference to five factual "scenarios."66 These scena-
rios differed in terms of the ·situation of the now-incapacitated 
individual- for example, whether the individual had executed a DPA 
and, if not, whether a surrogate for the individual is available. 67 
Within each scenario, the Working Group considered research proto-
cols with different levels of risks and potential benefits.68 Mter an op-
portunity for public comment, the Working Group issued a draft 
statute reflecting its preliminary policy recommendations. 69 
Scenario A: Consent by health care agent-DPA refers to research 
participation 
This scenario Involves an individual who, when able to under-
stand the nature of the action, gave broad written authority for the 
individual's health care agent to consent not only to health care, but 
64. Among the accounts describing concerns in this area, see Paul S. Appelbaum et al., 
The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 INT'Lj. L. & PSYCHIA-
TRY 319 (1982); Paul R. Benson et al., Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research: Preliminary 
Findings from an Ongoing Investigation, 20 Soc. Sc1. MED. 1331 (1985); Philip J. Candilis et 
al., A Survey of Researchers Using a Consent Policy for Cognitively Impaired Human Research Sub-
jects, 151RB: A REVIEW OF HuMAN SuBJECTS REsEARCH 1 (1993); Evan G. DeRenzo, The Ethics 
.of Involving Psychiatrically Impaired Persons in Research, IRB: A REviEW OF HuMAN SUBJECTS 
REsEARCH 7 (1994). . 
65. The Working Group's recommendations on subjects' assent indirectly address con-
cerns about an erroneous conclusion that an individual is incapable of giving informed 
consent. See infra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
66. Jack Schwartz, Initial Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group 7-
15 (Oct. 8, 1996) (unpublished report on file with the Attorney General's Research Work-
ing Group). 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. Jack Schwartz, Second Report of the "Attorney General's Research Working Group 
(May 5, 1997) [hereinafter Second Report] (the Second Report is reprinted in the appen-
dix to this issue of the journal of Health Care Law & Policy). 
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also to the individual's participation in research. DPAs that refer spe-
cifically to research participation are presently rare, if not nonexis-
tent. However, if state law recognized this use of an advance directive, 
presumably some people would want to include such a provision in 
their advance directives.70 Therefore, the Working Group considered 
whether the law should authorize consent by the health care agent 
under these circumstances, for particular types of research protocols. 
• Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk. 
• Working Group recommendations: Authorize the agent to consent 
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to 
participate in the particular protocol, even if the investigator 
can identify no reasonable prospect of direct benefit to the 
individual. 
For this first type of protocol, consensus was easily reached. The 
DPA reflects an atypical interest in research participation. The indi-
vidual also selected a health care agent to further that interest, and 
the agent may be presumed to have been chosen because of the 
agent's familiarity with the individual's character and values. Thus, 
deference is owed to the agent's judgment that the particular protocol 
is one that the individual would have wished to support through par-
ticipation. The individual's interest in self-determination, the Work-
ing Group believed, deserves respect even after the loss of decisional 
capacity. In this situation, autonomy interests are at their highest, and 
the low risk of the protocol minimizes concerns that arise from the 
principle of nonmaleficence.71 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect 
of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent if 
the agent concludes that participation would be in the individ-
ual's medical best interest, unless there is reason to believe that 
the individual would not have wanted to participate in the par-
ticular protocol. 
The characterization of research in terms of its potential for di-
rect medical benefit to the research subject reflects distinctions drawn 
in the federal regulations. For example, the IRB is to determine 
whether the risks to the research subject "are reasonable in relation to 
70. See Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276 
JAMA 67, 70 (1996). 
71. See THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & jAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
189-94 (4th ed. 1994). 
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anticipated benefits, if any .... "72 The Belmont Report asserts that 
"[r]esearch and practice may be carried on together when research is 
designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy."73 Because 
participation in research having the potential for direct medical bene-
fit involves "health care," as that term is used in the Health Care Deci-
sions Act, the Working Group's preliminary recommendation 
amounted to maintaining the legal status quo. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent 
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to 
participate in the particular protocol and either of the follow-
ing conditions is met: the protocol involves no more than a 
minor increase over minimal risk,74 or if the protocol involves 
more than a minor increase over minimal risk, a knowledgea-
ble person from outside the research team (for example, a 
member of an institution's ethics committee) confirms that the 
agent understands the goals and risks of the protocol. 
This type of protocol poses the greatest threat to vulnerable sub-
jects because it not only holds out no hope of personal benefit, but 
also exposes the subject to risks beyond those ordinarily encountered. 
Yet, the research-specific advance directive that is envisioned here 
marks the clearest possible statement of. personal choice. Respect for 
persons implies respect for self~etermination. 
There was initial agreement among Working Group members 
that, at a minimum, the state should allow an agent to consent if the 
individual had given express authorization for participation in this 
type of research and the research would involve no more than a minor 
increase over minimal risk. The issue for the Working Group was 
whether to go beyond this. Some members felt strongly that agents in 
this situation should not be so restricted and that there should be a 
mechanism to allow an agent to consent to participation in research 
for a decisionally impaired individual, even if the research involved a 
72. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (1996); see also, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 (1996) (referring 
to research "that holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject"). 
73. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL 
AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GuiDEUNES FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN SuBJECTS OF REsEARcH 4 (1979). Some commentators reject 
the distinction, however. See, e.g., Nancy M. P. King, Experimental Treatment: Oxymoron or 
Aspiration?, 25 HAsTINGs CENTER REP. 6 (1995). 
74. The tenn "minor increase over minimal risk" is used, but not defined, in the por-
tion of the federal regulations dealing with children as research subjects. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.406(a) (1996). 
HeinOnline -- 1 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 142 1998
142 jouRNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & PoLICY [VoL. 1:123 
sizeable increase over minimal risk, if the agent concluded that the 
patient would have wanted to participate in the protocol. 
The Working Group then considered what safeguards might be 
imposed in this situation. One recommendation was the use of a 
"consent monitor"-someone who would meet with the agent, go over 
the protocol in detail, and make certain that the agent had a clear 
understanding of its relevant risks and benefits. The basis for this sug-
gestion was the con.cern that, in many cases, .those who consent do not 
fully comprehend the risks of the protocol. 
The idea of a consent monitor did not originate with the Work-
ing·Group. A report by the National Commission on the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, on research 
involving those institutionalized as mentally infirm, suggested that 
where appropriate, an IRB "should appoint a consent auditor to olr 
serve the consent process and determine whether each subject (I) 
consents, or (II) is incapable of consenting and either assents or does 
not object, or (III) objects to participation."75 The concept is also 
used in the current federal regulations on research involving human 
subjects. These regulations state that "[a]n IRB shall conduct contin-
uing review of research ... at intervals appropriate to the degree of 
risk, but not less than once per year, and shall have authority to olr 
serve or have a third party observe the consent process and the 
research. "76 
Some members of the Working Group argued that the· involve-
ment of a third party in the consent process was too burdensome a 
requirement and would, in fact, promote a mistrust of research. One 
Working Group member commented that the proposed regulations 
for research on institutionalized mentally ill individuals died, in part, 
because of the consent auditor provisions. Others expressed concerns 
about the cost and other difficulties of implementing the concept. 
Given the nature of the protocol in question, however-a signifi-
cant increase over minimal risk and no prospect of direct medical 
benefit-and the relatively modest role of the monitor, the Working 
Group ultimately agreed that such a mechanism was appropriate. The 
members of the group made clear that they were not recommending 
that the monitor be required to second-guess the decision of the 
75. DeRenzo, supra note 64, at 8 (quoting the NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 73, at 8). 
The consent auditor, unlike the proposed consent monitor, would observe and determine 
the ability of the potential research subject to consent. The consent monitor would assist 
the subject's agent to understand the research protocol. 
76. 45 C.F.R § 46.109(e) (1996). 
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agent, but rather that the monitor would simply ensure that the agent 
understood the protocol and its risks. Thus, the safeguard would be 
one of process, not one of substance. 
The Working Group also discussed who might serve as a "consent 
monitor." One suggestion was to have a member of the institutional 
ethics committee serve in this function. 77 There was some debate 
about whether a member of an ethics committee or IRB would be 
most appropriate. Several Working Group participants felt that mem-
bers of the ethics committee would not be sufficiently knowledgeable 
about research issues to serve competently in this capacity. Others felt 
that often the IRB has too great a conflict of interest to adequately 
perform this role. The debate was not ultimately settled, although the 
Working Group did identify a member of an ethics committee as an 
example of someone who might serve as a consent monitor. 
Scenario B: Consent Uy a health care agent-DPA refers to health care only 
This scenario focuses on an individual who has executed an ad-
vance directive designating a health care agent to make health care 
decisions for the individual, but the document states nothing about 
consent to participation in research. This was believed to be the far 
more common scenario, because few existing advance directives in-
clude a statement regarding consent to research. 
• Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk. 
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent 
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to 
participate in the particular protocol, even if the investigator 
can identify no reasonable prospect of direct medical benefit to 
the individual. 
The 'working Group concluded that, although the DPA does not 
address research, autonomy interests are nevertheless reflected in the 
individual's decision to designate a particular person as health care 
agent. Therefore, the agent's judgment about the individual's prefer-
ence for participation ought to be honored when the risks of there-
search are minimal. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect 
of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
· 77. In Maryland, every hospital and nursing home is required to have an ethics com-
mittee (also called patient care advisory committee) available to consult about ethical is-
sues in patient care. Mo. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 19-370 to -374 (1996). For an 
argument against the use of ethics committee members in this role, see·Berg, supra note 8. 
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• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent 
if the agent concludes that participation would be in the indi-
vidual's medical best interest, unless there is reason to believe 
that the individual would not have wanted to participate in the 
particular protocol. 
This recommendation preserves the existing authority of the 
health care agent under the Health Care Decisions Act. When the 
protocol has the prospect for direct medical benefit, the health care 
agent can apply the decisional standards of the Act just as the agent 
would when contemplating other health care alternatives. 
A minority of the Working Group members disagreed with this 
position. The minority position would prohibit an agent from con-
senting to an individual's participation in a protocol if it might subject 
the individual to a significant risk of serious harm, for example, "the 
risk of a marked deterioration in a previously stable psychiatric disor-
der as a result of placement in the placebo arm of a double-blind, 
placebo-controlled trial."78 This view reflected a greater concern for 
the protection of vulnerable research subjects and greater skepticism 
of the ability of an agent to truly exercise the autonomy of the deci-
sionally impaired individual. 
There was also some discussion of restrictions that might be 
placed on an agent. For example, an agent who has an affiliation with 
the institution that is conducting the research might be precluded 
from consenting to the individual's participation in research con-
ducted at that institution. However, no agreement on this point was. 
reached. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent 
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to 
participate in the particular protocol and the agent's conclu-
sion is based on direct and explicit evidence of the individual's 
wish to participate, as documented in accordance with stan-
dards and procedures set by the IRB, and the protocol involves 
no more than a minor increase over minimal risk. 
The Working Group concluded that additional safeguards are 
warranted when the individual's advance directive does not itself ad-
dress research participation. It is ethically perilous, the group ob-
served, to expose an unconsenting individual to research exceeding 
minimal risk based solely on the consent of a health care agent. Yet 
78. See Opinion Letter, supra note 43. 
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the individual's decision to entrust a particular agent with responsibil-
ity for crucial health care decisions evidences a special regard for the 
agent's judgment worthy of respect in this context as well. The Work-
ing Group's recommendation sought to balance these considerations 
by requiring the agent to submit direct and explicit evidence of the 
individual's -wish to participate in this kind of protocol. Moreover, the 
recommendation capped the risk to -which the individual would be 
exposed: It is to be "no more than a minor increase over minimal 
risk." 
Scenario C: Surrogate consent 
This scenario addresses the common case in which an individual 
has not designated a health care agent, but has a family member or 
friend who is authorized to make health care decisions as a 
surrogate. 79 
• Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk. 
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the surrogate to con-
sent if the surrogate concludes that the individual would have 
wanted to participate in the particular protocol, even if the in-
vestigator can identify no reasonable prospect of direct medical 
benefit.to the individual. 
Given the minimal level of risk, the Working Group concluded 
that the surrogate's "substituted judgment"-that is, the surrogate's 
conclusion that the individual would have wanted to participate in the 
protocol-should be honored. When the risks are low, the surro-
gate's decision may be presumed to be a product of knowledge gained 
from the family ties or other intimate links between the individual and 
the surrogate. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect 
of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the surrogate to con-
sent if the surrogate concludes that participation would be in 
the individual's medical best interest, unless there is reason to 
believe that the individual would not have wanted to partici-
pate in the particular protocol. 
Given the prospect of direct medical benefit, the Working Group 
decided to follow the model of the Health Care Decisions Act. The 
group's recommendation generally preserves the existing authority of 
the surrogate. 
79. See supra text accompanrng notes 37-40. 
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The surrogate's authority, however, unlike that of a health care 
agent, is subject to an important limitation under current Maryland 
law: "A surrogate may not authorize ... [t]reatment for a mental 
disorder."80 Mter considerable discussion, the Working Group rec-
ommended that the Act's exclusion should be modified for both 
clinical and research decision-making. The group tentatively favored 
a provision that would prQhibit a surrogate from consenting to an indi-
vidual's admission to a mental facility, as under current law, but would 
allow a surrogate to consent to most treatments for a mental disorder 
(or to expected-benefit research) once an individual had been admit-
ted through the involuntary commitment process. The Working 
Group proposed, however, that a surrogate not be authorized to con-
sent to "a behavior modification program involving aversive stimuli."81 
The group recognized the possibility that an individual's surro-
gates, for example, adult children, might not agree whether participa-
tion in the protocol would be in the individual's "medical best 
interest." The group felt that, in these circumstances, the researchers 
should submit the dispute to an institution's ethics committee for a 
recommendation, as is prescribed under the Health Care Decisions 
Act when surrogates disagree about the course of treatment for an 
incapacitated patient.82 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: . Participation in the research 
would not be authorized. 
The Working Group concluded that reliance on the surrogate's 
"substituted judgment" would be insufficient, given the absence of po-
tential for direct medical benefit and the degree of risk. Unlike an 
agent, a surrogate does not carry the individual's endorsement and 
implied confidence in the agent's overall judgment and feel for the 
individual's presumed wishes. 
Scenario D: Consent by a non-surrogate proxy-advance directive guidance 
This scenario would arise where a cognitively impaired individual 
does not have a guardian or anyone to act as surrogate and had not 
designated a health care agent (or the designated agent was deceased 
or otherwise unavailable), but had made an advance directive stating 
80. Mo. CooE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(d) (1994). The term "mental disorder" is 
not defined. 
81. Second Report, supra note 69, at A-12 and B-3 to B-4. 
82. MD. CoDE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(b) (1994). 
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his or her desire to participate in research. At present, this scenario is 
more theoretical than real. 
• Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk. 
• Working Group recommendation: The individual's participation in 
the research may be authorized by a monitor who would make 
an informed and objective decision about both enrollment and 
continuing participation in the protocol. The monitor would 
decide on the basis of the advance directive, other relevant in-
formation· (e.g., the individual's prior partiCipation in like re-
search), and the specific nature of the protocol. 
Respect for autonomy suggested to the Working Group that an 
advance directive expressly identifying the individual's desire to par-
ticipate in research ought to be honored in appropriate circum-
stances. One of these circumstances is the minimal risk posed by this 
category of protocol. 
The role of the monitor in this scenario would be more substan-
tive than the role of the consent monitor discussed earlier. Instead of 
merely observing someone else's informed consent process, the moni-
tor here would actually make the decision.83 
Given the monitor's expanded role, the Working Group was con-
cerned about the nee~ to safeguard the monitor's objectivity. The 
group concluded .that the. monitor, eithe~ an indi~du~l or a small 
committee, must not have· a stake in the.research itsdf.and must be 
free of undue institutional constraints in performing the assigned 
tasks. The Working Group reached rio consensus, however, on the 
degree to which the monitor must be independent of the institution 
in which the research would be conducted. In one view, the monitor 
ought not to be an employee of the research institution. Another 
point of view was that mere employment alone was insufficient to dis-
qualify someone from the role envisioned for the monitor. The Wqrk-
ing Group deferred for public commen·t and further discussion the 
particular connections between the monitor and the sponsoring insti-
tution that would be too attenuated to affect the monitor's independ-
ent judgment. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prosp~ct 
of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: An independent monitor may 
consent to the individual's participation in the research if the 
83. In its statutory recommendation, the Working Group refers to a monitor with deci· 
sion·making authority as a "proxy decision-maker." See Second Report, supra note 69, at A· 
4. 
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monitor concludes based on the advance directive, that the in-
dividual would have wanted to participate in the particular pro-
tocol and that participation would be in the individual's 
medical best interest. The monitor would have responsibility 
for the individual's continued participation as well. 
In the view of the Working Group, the substituted judgment and 
best interest assessments required when research is of potential bene-
fit to the individual need not be made by a court. Given the potential 
for benefit, protection of the individual can best be achieved through 
a less formal process that nevertheless does not rely on the investiga-
tors themselves to make crucialjudgments about the individual's pre-
sumed wishes or the individual's best interests. Rather, under the 
proposal these responsibilities, both at the time of enrollment and 
throughout the course. of the protocol, would be vested in . the 
monitor. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research 
would not be authorized. 
The Working Group concluded that reliance on an advance di-
rective alone under these circumstances would not be ethically justi-
fied. It is most unlikely that the document itself would have been 
written with adequate knowledge o(the details of a future research 
protocol. Moreover, unlike the situation in which the individual's des-
ignated agent- is available to act as advocate and protector, here no 
one has intimate knowledge of the individual's values and attitudes. 
The bare document alone is insufficient to expose the individual to 
research involving this degree of risk without the prospect of direct 
medical benefit. 
Scenario E: Consent by a non-surrogate proxy- no advance directive 
Scenario E involves an individual who has not executed an ad-
vance directive and who has no family member or close friend author-
ized to act as surrogate. 
• Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk. 
• Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research 
would not be authorized unless the protocol presented a rea-
sonable prospect of direct medical benefit to the individual 
and ~he individual's participation is authorized by a court pur-
suant to existing guardianship procedures. 
In the absence of any written indication of the individual's wishes 
regarding research and in the absence of anyone with intimate knowl-
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edge of the individual, the Working Group initially concluded that 
research with no prospect of direct medical benefit should be ruled 
out, regardless of the degree of risk. Subsequently, however, the 
Working Group recognized that evidence of the individual's wishes 
apart from an advance directive might be sufficient to justify participa-
tion in-minimal risk research. Su~h participation could be authorized 
by a court under traditional guardianship procedures and standards. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect 
of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: The individual's participation in 
the research may be authorized by a court pursuant to existing 
guardianship procedures. 
Again, the Working Group concluded that traditional guardian-
ship procedures and standards should be applied. 
• Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual. 
• Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research 
would not be authorized. 
In the Working Group's view, respect for persons absolutely pre-
cludes research participation under these circumstances. 
C. Subject Assent 
The Working Group's recommendations included provisions call-
ing for the assent of subjects, even when a proxy is authorized to give 
consent to research participation. This concept has been incorporated 
into the federal regulations applicable to research involving children. 
Under these regulations, an IRB "shall determine that adequate provi-
sions are made for soliciting the assent of the children, when in the 
judgment of the IRB the children are capable of providing assent."84 
"Assent" is defined as "a child's affirmative agreement to participate in 
research. "85 
The Working Group elaborated significantly on this requirement 
by recommending that decisionally impaired individuals be told that 
they are to participate in research and that someone else has con-
sented to their participation.86 Furthermore, as recommended by the 
Working Group, "an investigator may not compel a decisionally inca-
pacitated individual to perform an action related to the research if the 
84. 45 C.F.R § 46.408(a) (1996). 
85. 45 C.F.R § 46.402(b) (1996). 
86. Second Report, supra note 69, at A-9. 
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individual refuses to take the action after being asked to do so."87 
Through these means, the Working Group sought to allay concerns 
about coerced research participation discussed in the 1~D. case.88 
IV. NEXT STEPS 
The Working Group's recommendations represent .an important 
way-station in the state's efforts to reach agreement on this issue and 
put into effect workable procedures and safeguards for the participa-
tion of decisionally impaired individuals in medical research proto-
cols. The Attorney General of Maryland, convener of the Working 
Group, has emphasized the need for a broadly inclusive policy devel-
opment process. The process includes several steps: First, the Work-
ing Group's initial report, containing its preliminary policy 
recommendations, was sent for comment to more than 70 research-
ers, ethicists, patient advocates, health facility administrators, and 
others. These recipients were encouraged to distribute the report to 
others in their respective communities. In this way, the report gained 
fairly wide attention among those in Maryland and those elsewhere 
who are most concerned about research with decisionally impaired 
subjects. 
Second, the Attorney General's Office held two public meetings 
about the initial report. These were open forums, at which anyone 
could ask questions or offer comments. Mter the public meetings, the 
Working Group studied the comments and revised its initial 
recommendations. 
Third, the Working Group's revised recommendations, in the 
form of a draft statute, were widely distributed for comments and were 
critiqued at a public conference. In light of the comments, the Work-
ing Group revised the text of the proposed statute and solicited com-
ments once again. This latest draft reflects a significant restructuring 
of the proposal, intended to achieve greater clarity, but does not de-
part from the Working Group's main policy recommendations.89 
Finally, assuming that a fair degree of agreement emerges, the 
Attorney General will look for legislators to sponsor the proposed leg-
islation in the Maryland General Assembly. Thus the process, with its 
expanding circles of involvement-first a small working group, then 
87. /d. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
89. Jack Schwartz, Third Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group 
(August 1, 1997) (the Third Report is reprinted in the appendix to this issue of the journal 
of Health Care Law & Policy). 
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those particularly interested in biomedical research, then the public 
generally and its elected representatives-will have concluded. 
This process has yielded debate on a number of difficult issues. 
One such issue is the Working Group's reliance on categories of risk. 
The term "minimal risk," although defined in the federal regulations, 
leaves much room for interpretation by an IRB and has been criti-
cized for its imprecision.90 One participant in discussion at a meeting, 
for example, pointed out that the federal definition does not clearly 
identify the perspective from which "risk" is to be assessed: that of 
healthy individuals, or that of individuals with an impairment similar 
to the research subject's.91 Proper regard for the welfare of subjects 
might require a shift in perspective, depending on the nature of the 
risk. For instance, psychological distress ought to be assessed from the 
perspective of a person with a cognitive impairment; harms to dignity, 
however, ought to be assessed from the perspective of a healthy 
individual. 
Other commentators criticized the Working Group's reliance on 
gradations of risk - "minor increase over minimal risk" and "greater 
than minor increase over minimal risk" - that are not clearly distin-
guishable. Federal regulations on the participation of children in 
medical research use the term "minor increase over minimal risk" but 
do not define it.92 Without clarification, local IRBs will define the 
terms on a case-by-case basis, leaving room for some inconsistency in 
their application.93 
Another issue that evoked comment is the application of a "medi-
cal best interest test" to participation in research. Conceptually it may 
sometimes be difficult to apply this standard to research. In general, 
when an intervention is being tested as part of a research protocol, 
90. Berg, supra note 8, at 24. 
91. 28 C.F.R. § 46.102 (i). The Department of justice regulations pertaining to protec-
tion of human subjects, the definition of "minimal risk" is ambiguous. The st.-.ndard in 
§ 46.102(i) is "that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the 
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily 
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." 
Protections of Human Subjects, 28 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1997). In contrast, the definition of 
the term in 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(d) (1996), the HHS regulations pertaining to research in-
volving prisoners, implies that, when the research subjects are not generally healthy (as 
prisoners are presumed to be) risk is to be assessed by reference to the group of subjects, 
who often will routinely experience medical interventions beyond those experienced by 
healthy individuals. 
92. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-.406 (1996). 
93. In its most recent recommendations, the Working Group proposed that the Secre-
tary of Health and Mental Hygiene be authorized to issue regulations identifying the risk 
of particular procedures. 
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there is considerable uncertainty about its benefit or effectiveness as 
compared to standard therapy. Although there is also uncertainty 
about the effectiveness of an intervention in the clinical context, un-
certainty in the research setting is of a different scope and type than 
in the clinical setting. In the clinical context, an intervention presum-
ably has been proven effective for some percentage of individuals. 
The uncertainty relates to the effectiveness of the intervention on a 
particular individual and may vary due to the individual's age, severity 
of illness, other diagnoses, and the general variability of human re-
sponse to medical interventions. In the research context, the uncer-
tainty is related to whether an intervention is effective for anyone with 
the particular disorder in question. Some may argue that, while the 
potential benefits of the intervention in a research setting may be 
wholly uncertain, there are other benefits to being part of a research 
protocol that justify participation of a cognitively impaired individual. 
These may include increased medical attention and better quality 
medical care. Yet these "benefits" are what might better be termed 
"indirect," not attributable to the intervention being tested. Should a 
medical best interest test be broad enough to include such indirect 
benefits, or should the test be limited to the direct benefits of the 
intervention? 
Also, it will be a significant challenge to apply the test to a proto-
col involving a double-blind, placebo-controlled study. While the 
opinion letter of the Attorney General's office indicates that participa-
tion in such a protocol might be in the patient's best interest,94 some 
question whether a medical best interest test can ever justify participa~ 
tion in research where there is a probability of no benefit. On the 
other hand, if standard therapy is non-existent or noxious, then the 
risks associated with participation in a placebo study might be 
justifiable. 
Other comments addressed surrogate authorization for participa-
tion in no-expected-benefit research. A few commentators argued that 
this departure from the principle of informed consent by the research 
subject was not justified and posed an unacceptable risk to vulnerable 
persons. Yet, other commentators criticized the Working Group for 
limiting surrogate authority to minimal risk research, because the lim-
itation would inhibit important research aimed at improving under-
standing of the underlying disease process or its diagnosis. 
While the Working Group's recommendations reflect concerns 
of both the research community and advocates for the decisionally 
94. Opinion Lette•·, supra note 43. 
HeinOnline -- 1 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 153 1998
1998] PROXY CONSENT-MARYLAND's POLICY INITIATIVE 153 
impaired, they are limited by the experience of those on the Working 
Group. With broad public participation, ideally the ultimate policy 
recommendation will reflect an appropriate balance between views of 
these different groups. Finally, the process and outcome may serve as 
a model for other states as they take up this important issue. 
